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Abstract
We extend the New Keynesian Monetary Policy literature relaxing the assump-
tion that the decisions are taken by a single policymaker, considering instead that
monetary policy decisions are taken collectively in a committee. We introduce a
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), whose members have diﬀerent preferences be-
tween output and inﬂation variability and have to vote on the level of the interest
rate.
This paper helps to explain interest rate smoothing from a political economy
point of view, in which MPC members face a bargaining problem on the level
of the interest rate. In this framework, the interest rate is a non-linear reaction
function on the lagged interest rate and the expected inﬂation. This result comes
from a political equilibrium in which there is a strategic behaviour of the agenda
setter with respect to the rest MPC’s members.
Our approach can also reproduce both features documented by the empirical
evidence on interest rate smoothing: a) the modest response of the interest rate
to inﬂation. and output gap; and. b) the dependence on lagged interest rate.
Features that are diﬃcult to reproduce alltogether in standard New Keynesian
models. It also provides a theoretical framework on how disagreement among pol-
icymakers can slow down the adjustment on interest rates and on “menu costs” in
interest rate decisions. Furthermore, a numerical excercise shows that this inertial
behaviour of the interest rate is internalised by the economic agents through an
increase in expected inﬂation.
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11 Introduction
An existing puzzle in the optimal monetary policy literature is why, in practice, central
banks change the interest rate less often than the theory predicts. This feature is called
interest rate smoothing and it is well documented for many central banks1. For instance,
Lowes and Ellis (1997), in a study for diﬀerent countries, listed as the common patterns
in oﬃcial interest rates set by central banks: they change rarely, they are made in a
sequence of steps in the same direction, and they are left unchanged for relatively long
periods of time before moving in the opposite direction.
Regarding interest rates reaction functions, Taylor (1993) proposed a policy rule for
the interest rate, modelled by a linear combination of output gap and inﬂation, as a
rough description of the monetary policy for the USA during the chairmanship of Alan
Greenspan. On the other hand, some authors, such as Judd and Rudebusch (1998),
Clarida and others (1999) and Orphanides (2003), have pointed out that, empirically,
the monetary policy rule that best captures the data has the following form:
it = (1 − ρ)
 
i + φππt + φxxt

+ ρit−1 + t
where i is a constant, interpretable as the steady state nominal interest rate. πt and
xt are the inﬂation and output gap, respectively. ρ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that reﬂects
the degree of lagged dependence in the interest rate. In these estimations, interest
rate smoothing is present in two ways. Firstly, the estimated coeﬃcients φπ and φx
are typically smaller than the optimal rule would suggest; and secondly, the partial
adjustment to movements in πt and xt is reﬂected by the presence of it−1. In other
words, the empirical form of the oﬃcial interest rate is a weighted average of some
desired value that depends on the state of the economy and on the lagged interest rate.
Also, the estimates of ρ are on the order of 0.7 or 0.9 for quarterly data, which indicates
a very slow adjustment in practice.
The existing literature that explains interest rate smoothing has three branches. The
ﬁrst explanation relies on the eﬀects of uncertainty on the policy decisions. Uncertainty
about the structure and the state of the economy can lead to lower response of the interest
rate to shocks. An early work by William Brainard (1967) showed that uncertainty on
the parameters of the economy’s equations reduces policy activism, which means a more
cautious response to shocks. In more recent papers the actions taken by policymakers are
those with outcomes that they are conﬁdent about. For that reason, they delay action
until they collect enough information about a shock. On the other hand, Clarida and
others (1999) argue that model uncertainty may help to explain the fairly low variability
of interest rate in the data. However, they consider that it does not capture the feature
of strong lagged dependence in the interest rate.
A second explanation, given by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) can help to explain
the lagged dependence feature. Their argument is based on the eﬀects of the short-term
interest rates on the aggregate demand through the eﬀect on long-term interest rates.
Being long-term interest rates those that aﬀect aggregate demand. Lagged dependence
1See Sack and Wieland (2000) for a discussion on interest rate smoothing.
2in short-term interest rates allows the central bank to manipulate long-term rates with
more modest movements in the short-term rate than otherwise needed. Therefore, the
central bank may care about avoiding excessive volatility in the short-term interest rate
in pursuing its stabilisation goal. In the same context, Goodhart (1999) and Woodford
(1999) argue that inertial monetary policy makes the future path of short-term interest
rates more predictable and increases policy eﬀectiveness. These authors provide a rea-
sonable explanation for lagged dependence on interest rate. However, it is still to be seen
if this story can account as well for the empirically modest response of the short-term
rate to inﬂation and output gap.
A third explanation is based on ﬁnancial markets stability. It considers that large
movements in the interest rate are avoided because they destabilise ﬁnancial markets
(Goodfriend 1991). Therefore, by changing policy rates gradually central banks can
reduce the likelihood that a change in policy triggers excessive reactions. In a forward-
looking environment with rational expectations, concern about the variance of the in-
terest rate induces interest rate smoothing.
Among other explanations, Clarida and others (1999) argue that disagreement among
policy makers is another explanation for slow adjustment rates. However, they consider
that this story has not yet been well developed and this is where we want to provide
an alternative framework. The current literature on interest rate smoothing, as well as
most of the literature on optimal monetary policy, relies on the assumption that policy
decisions are taken by a single policy maker that maximises some measure of social
welfare. However, in real life this is not the case, because in practice monetary policy
decisions are taken mostly collectively, in committees.
This paper intends to explain interest rate smoothing giving more structure to the
decision-making process, in which policy decisions are made through a Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), whose members have diﬀerent preferences. This paper helps to
explain interest rate smoothing from a political economy point of view, in which members
of an MPC have a bargaining problem on the interest rate. In this framework, the
political equilibrium interest rate is a function of the lagged interest rate and expected
inﬂation. We have found that when the diﬀerence between expected inﬂation and its
long run value is relatively high, the interest rate reacts as the optimal monetary policy
predicts. However, the smaller the diﬀerence, the interest rate reacts less than the
optimal or does not react at all.
The literature on Monetary Policy Committees is fairly new and it has focused mainly
on how the structure of an MPC can aﬀect the policy decisions. It has two branches, the
ﬁrst branch considers the case of members with diﬀerent preferences and how this aﬀects
expectations formation and policy outcomes2. The second branch of the literature of
MPCs has focused on the diﬀerences in skills among members and how it interacts with
2Aksoy, De Grauwe and Dewachter (2002) and Von Hagen and S¨ uppel (1994) have worked on the
case of a monetary union in which, because of nationality, the members have diﬀerent goals regarding
the level of inﬂation and output gap. Riboni (2003) and Silbert (2004) show that in a committee with
members with diﬀerent inﬂation targets, the policymaker’s capacity to bring down surprise inﬂation is
reduced. Waller (1989) showed that assigning the task of conducting monetary policy to a committee
with staggered membership enhances continuity in expectations formation and reduces inﬂation.
3diﬀerent voting rules3.
Considering the existing literature on MPCs, this research is closer to Riboni’s (2003)
and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia’s (2006). In Riboni’s model, a committee with heteroge-
neous preferences can work as a substitute of a commitment technology when there is
dynamic bargaining among members. In this model, the member in charge of setting
the agenda to vote is less willing to deviate from the optimal time-consistent inﬂation
level, because it will reduce her negotiation power next period. This model has a vot-
ing mechanism similar to ours, in which there exists an agenda-setter that every period
submits a policy to vote, but it diﬀers from us in the type of heterogeneity and on
the dynamics of the model. Riboni works on heterogeneity in inﬂation goals, whilst we
work on heterogeneity in the relative weights in the preferences between output gap and
inﬂation among members. Also, Riboni’s model is dynamic from a political economy
point of view, but its economic structure is static since there are no shocks that aﬀect
the economy diﬀerently every period. In other work, Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006)
introduce a dynamic voting model, where forward looking policymakers make decisions
taking into account the consequences of changing the status quo, which also generates
interest rate smoothing.
Our model relaxes the traditional assumption that monetary policy decisions are
made by a single policy maker and introduces strategic decisions in an MPC with het-
erogeneous preferences. This approach is new in the interest rate smoothing literature
and helps to explain this problem through a diﬀerent channel, from a political economy
point of view. It also provides a theoretical framework on how disagreement among pol-
icymakers can slow the adjustment on interest rates and on adjustment costs or ”menu
costs” in interest rate decisions.
Moreover, this model can also reproduce altogether both features of interest rate
smoothing, which are the modest response of the interest rate to inﬂation and output
gap and the lagged dependence. These are features that other models fail to reproduce
at the same time. In our model, when lagged interest rates are close to the current
period optimum, they do not change because it is costly to have an agreement among
members. Only when the size of the shocks is such that it is sub-optimal to keep the
interest rate, it will be changed. However, in other cases the change will be below the
optimal, in the exact size necessary to obtain a coalition for passing the new interest
rate, or equal to the optimal, when the expected inﬂation is high enough that make the
status quo sub-optimal.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The second section presents the bench-
mark model in the spirit of the New Keynesian monetary economics. The third section
introduces the policy decision problem in an MPC with members with heterogeneous
preferences and solves the political economy problem. The fourth section presents some
3Gersbach and Hahn (2001) showed that less skilled policymakers in general want to abstain from
voting. If a voting record is published, they try to mimic their more skilful colleagues; therefore voting
records can be undesirable. Karotkin (1996) analysed the performance of diﬀerent voting rules in
committees in which individual skills diﬀer. Berk and Bierut (2003) introduce the eﬀects of learning
on the performance of voting rules. In a new strand of the literature, Gerlach-Kristen (2003b, 2004,
2006a) studies the eﬀects of uncertainty about the state of the economy when the members have the
same skills.
4stylised facts on the voting process for some MPCs in relation with its eﬀects on interest
rate adjustments. The last section concludes.
2 Benchmark Model
During the past years, it has been a broad use of theoretical models of monetary pol-
icy based on the techniques of general equilibrium theory. On this literature, the New
Keynesian approach departs from the real business cycle theory with the explicit in-
corporation of nominal price rigidities. These models are fairly simple and have some
qualitative core features that are suitable to evaluate monetary policy. In order of be-
ing able to compare our results with the existing literature, we depart from a baseline
framework for the analysis of monetary policy based on a New Keynesian perspective.
In this section we develop our benchmark model with a single policymaker, which fol-
lows closely Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). In the next section
we will analyse the policy problem under a Monetary Policy Committee with members
with heterogeneous preferences in which the interest rate is determined in a political
equilibrium.
We assume a closed economy; all the variables are expressed as log deviations from
the steady state. The economic equilibrium in this economy is given by the intersec-
tion of the aggregate demand (AD) and the aggregate supply (AS). As in any standard
macroeconomic model, the aggregate demand is determined by ”IS” and ”LM” equilib-
rium. In our model the ”IS” relates the output gap inversely to the real interest rate and
the ”LM” is represented by the nominal interest rate chosen by the central bank as pol-
icy instrument. The aggregate supply (AS) is represented by the Phillips curve, which
relates the inﬂation positively to the output gap. These two equations can be obtained
from a standard general equilibrium model with price frictions. We can summarise the
economy by two equations, the ”IS” and the ”AS”, that have the following form4:
xt = −ϕ[it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ] + Etxt+1 (IS)
πt = λxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (AS)
where πt and xt are the period t inﬂation and output gap it and rn
t are the nominal
and the natural interest rate 5. All the variables are expressed as log-deviations from
their long-run level. According to the IS, lower real interest rate and higher future
output increases current output. On the other hand, in the Phillips curve the output
gap variable captures movements in marginal costs associated with changes in excess
4The IS equation can obtained from log-linearising the Euler equation from the household’s optimal
consumption decisions. The Phillips curve can be obtained from aggregating the log-linear approxi-
mation of the individual ﬁrm pricing decisions. The price friction in this model comes from staggered
nominal price setting in the essence Taylor (1979). The most common formulation of staggered price
setting in the literature comes from Calvo (1983), in which he assumes that in any given period a ﬁrm
has ﬁxed probability of keeping its price ﬁxed during the period.
5The natural interest rate is deﬁned as the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of fully ﬂexible
prices.
5demand and the shock ut captures anything else that might aﬀect expected marginal
costs. ut is usually named as a ”cost push” shock and it is related to supply shocks that
do not aﬀect the potential output. Moreover, ut gives a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
output gap stabilisation. We assume the disturbance term ut follow:
ut = ρut−1 + εt
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and εt is an i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and variance σ2
u.
We assume, following much of the literature on optimal monetary policy, that the



















where the parameter α is the relative weight on output deviations. This loss function
takes potential output and zero inﬂation rate as the targets for the deviations of out-
put and inﬂation from the deterministic long-run trend. During the past years have
been some works on deriving the policy problem from ﬁrst principles. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003) show that an objective function of the form of
(1) can be obtained as a quadratic approximation of the utility-based welfare6. Though,
this works rely on some assumptions, like representative agent economy, which can be
a restrictive representation of how the preferences over inﬂation and output gap really
are. However, they are useful to establish the policy problem from the welfare criterion.
Moreover, Woodford (2003) shows that the weight α is a function of the primitive param-
eters of the model, such as the slope of the Phillips curve and the degree of monopolistic
competition.
2.1 The Policy Problem for a Single Policymaker
In this part we assume that the policy decisions are taken by a single policymaker. We
further assume the policymaker is unable to commit their future policies; therefore he
cannot change the private sector expectations with policy announcements over future
policy decisions. In each period the policy maker chooses the policy instrument to
maximise the welfare function subject to the IS and the AS. The policymaker’s problem















xt = −ϕ[it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ] + Etxt+1
πt = λxt + βEtπt+1 + ut
6In these works the output gap is included in the welfare function, because the volatility of income
reduces welfare. On the other hand, inﬂation is included because, as ﬁrms face uncertainty on the time
when they are going to be able to adjust their price, higher aggregate inﬂation increases the volatility
of the individual price and income.
6where EtWt+1 = W t+1 is taken as given by the Policymaker, since her cannot cred-
ibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment. Moreover, in order to obtain
tractability on the problem, we focus on the optimum within a simple family of policy
rules, which is a linear function of expected inﬂation.
Proposition 1 The optimal feedback policy for the interest rate, within the family rules




where φπ = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕα > 1.
See appendix D for a derivation. According to this policy rule, the nominal interest
rate should rise in response to a rise in expected inﬂation, and that increase should be
high enough to increase real rates. In other words, in the optimal rule for the nominal
interest rate, the coeﬃcient on expected inﬂation should exceed unity (that is φπ > 1)7.
Moreover, in this policy rule, the interest rate is adjusted to perfectly oﬀset shocks
that aﬀect the natural interest rate, but to partially oﬀset cost-push shocks (that is
∂πt/∂ut > 0).. Therefore, when ”cost-push” shocks are present, the optimal policy rule
incorporates convergence of inﬂation to its target over time. Also, the relative weight
between output and inﬂation stabilisation is given by the parameter alpha.
3 The Policy Problem in a Monetary Policy Com-
mittee
The traditional approach on the optimal monetary policy literature relies on the as-
sumption that decisions are taken by a single policymaker. However, in real-life this is
not the case, because in practice monetary policy decisions are taken mostly collectively
in a committee. In this section we introduce a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in
charge of the monetary policy decisions. Also, we assume that the members in the MPC
diﬀer in their preferences. More precisely, they have diﬀerent relative weight between
output and inﬂation stabilisation in their policy objectives 8.
7In contrast, in the case of a single policymaker that can commit to a policy rule, and if the policy





π = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕαc ≥ γπ because αc = α(1 − βρ) < α. See Clarida and others (1999) for a
derivation. Therefore, commitment increases the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, reducing expected
inﬂation.
8We work on the heterogeneity in the weights but not on heterogeneity on the targets. Heterogeneity
on targets gives diﬀerent inﬂation bias among members, whilst the degree of adjustment of the interest
rate to shocks is the same for every member. In other words, with heterogeneity on targets the members
only diﬀer on the level of the interest rate, and this diﬀerence is independent of the type and size of
shocks
7We assume the MPC has three members 9, j = {1,2,3}, each one with diﬀerent
preference parameters: α1 < α2 < α3. The ﬁrst (third) member is the most (least)
conservative, while the second has moderate preferences over inﬂation and output gap.
Therefore, the aggressiveness in the response of the interest rate to expected inﬂation
decreases with the index of each member.
3.1 Bargaining problem
We assume the policy decision is a bargaining problem in the spirit of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), which is closer to how the interest rate is decided in practise by an MPC. In
every period the interest rate is determined by the following game: one member, the
agenda setter, proposes a new interest rate. Then, the members of the MPC vote. We
assume that it is necessary a simple majority to have the new interest rate approved.
Then, the new interest rate is implemented if at least two out of three members of the
MPC approve it, otherwise the last period interest rate is maintained.
In this voting system the status quo is given by last period interest rate, it means
that this is the default interest rate if the members do not accept the new interest rate
proposed by the agenda setter. Moreover, because the agenda setter makes a take-it-
or-leave-it proposal, she has a ﬁrst mover advantage, which in this setup gives her more
bargaining power than to the other MPC’s members. Therefore, the agenda setter can
strategically set to vote an interest rate that maximises her own utility constrained by




















xt = −ϕ[it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ] + Etxt+1 (3)









t (it) ≥ W
j
t (it−1) for at least one j 6= A
The problem for the agenda setter is similar to the benchmark model, but with an
extra constraint. Within an MPC, the agenda setter has to choose an interest rate
such that also obtains the majority needed for approval. This problem includes some
participation constraints on the behaviour of the other members. According to these
participation constraints, the new interest rate should give at least the same utility than
the status quo for the agenda setter and at least one additional member.
9We assume a committee of three members because this is the minimum odd number of members in
order to have a conﬂict.
8Since MPC members have diﬀerent preferences over output and inﬂation stabilisa-
tion, there is a conﬂict on the size of the adjustment of the interest rate to ”cost-push”
shocks. For this reason, the political economy solution will depend on the size and
direction of the shocks. When shocks aﬀecting the natural rate are big relatively to
”cost-push” shocks (ut), there is no conﬂict among members since their preferred inter-
est rates are similar. However, in the opposite case, when the ”cost-push” shock are
big relatively to shocks aﬀecting the natural rate, the MPC’s members have diﬀerent
preferences on the policy instrument. In that case, the political economy solution will
depend on the state variable it−1 and the shocks. For simplicity, in order to describe
easily the mechanism, we will focus in the case where there are no shocks aﬀecting the
natural rate, that is we assume rn
t = 0.
3.2 MPC members’ reaction functions
Since MPC’s members cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment,
they take private sector expectations as given when solving their optimisation problem10.
Therefore, as in the case of section 5.2, the private sector forms beliefs rationally con-
ditional on the MPC’s reaction function. Given absence of commitment, member j0s


















t+1 are taken as given. Therefore, similar to the case of the previous section,
her preferences are maximised by i
j∗










11. This optimal rate is similar to the rate in the single policymaker
case for α = αj. Moreover, given the ordering of the preference parameter αj, the




π. Then, the more conservative a MPC member is, the stronger she
prefers the interest rate to react to expected inﬂation.
Conditional on the shocks, the welfare function for every MPC member is strictly
concave in the interest rate, which is maximised at the member-j optimal rate it = i
j∗
t .
The concavity comes from the quadratic preferences. Because of this concavity it is
possible to deﬁne i
j
t, the member-j participation rate, the interest rate that would make
member j indiﬀerent between this rate and the status quo interest rate (it−1):
10This assumption also allow us to simplify greatly the problem, since expectations are taken as ﬁxed
by the MPC members, the political equilibrium doesn’t depend on the rational expectations economic
equilibrium. If this were not the case, the ﬁxed point problem would be more diﬃcult to solve and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is not guarantied.









ρ (Etπt+1 − ρπt). However, to get the simplest result as possible, we have assumed the second
element is zero, as in the single-policymaker case when expected inﬂation is a linear combination of the
shocks. The results don’t change if we include the more general policy rule, but notation gets more
complicated.
9Proposition 2 Given last period interest rate, it−1, member j will be indiﬀerent between
i
j






See proof in appendix D. The member-j participation rate (i
j
t) gives to her the same










t (it−1) = 0. Figure 5.1 shows the
preferences over the interest rate for member j. As we mentioned before, the welfare
function is concave on the interest rate and it is maximised at the member-j optimal
rate, i
j∗
t . The graph shows a case where the last period interest rate is lower than the
optimal rate (that is it−1 < i
j∗
t ). According to this case, the participation rate is higher
than the optimal rate. Then, any rate between last period’s and the participation rate
will give her higher utility than the status quo. That means that member-j will be
willing to accept a rate diﬀerent than the optimal rate in order to be better oﬀ than the
status quo. We can also generalise the opposite case: when last period’s rate is on the
right of member-j optimal rate, the participation rate will be on the left of last period’s
rate and any rate in between will give her higher utility than the status quo.
Figure 1: Welfare function
3.3 The policy problem
The agenda setter has a ﬁrst mover advantage, because she can inﬂuence other member’s
decisions through the interest rate she sends to vote. In ﬁgure 5.2 we show one example
of how she can inﬂuence the vote of a member j. Let’s assume the status quo interest
rate (it−1) is below the agenda setter’s optimal rate (iA∗
t ). The panel on the left (right)
shows a case when the agenda setter’s optimal rate is lower (higher) than member-j
10participation rate. In this example the initial interest rate is low and there is an increase
in expected inﬂation (most likely because of a “cost-push” shock). Both members j and
A want an increase in the policy rate, but A prefers a higher increase than j. If the
agenda setter’s optimal rate is not too high, as in the case on the left, member-j will
accept it. However, if it is too high, as in the case on the right, it violates member-j




Figure 2: a) Policy problem when: iA∗ < ij. b) Policy problem when: iA∗ < ij.
In this subsection we analyse the optimisation problem for the agenda setter and its
implications for interest rate smoothing. We show that what matters for interest rate
smoothing is the identity of the agenda setter, the degree of heterogeneity of preferences
among members and the size of the shocks. In brief, we observe interest rate smoothing
only when the agenda setter is either the ﬁrst or the third member, and not when she
is the second member. The following propositions summarise our results taking into
account the identity of the agenda setter.
Proposition 3 When the agenda setter is the member with median preferences, member
2, there is no interest rate smoothing
The policy problem when the agenda setter is the second member satisﬁes the median
voter theorem. In this case, she is always able to form a coalition with either the ﬁrst or
the third member, to support her most preferred rate. Therefore, there is not interest
rate smoothing when the agenda setter is the member with median preferences.
Member 1 prefers a more active interest rate to reduce deviations of inﬂation around
its long–run value, while member 3 prefers a less active policy to reduce deviations in
output gap. The agenda setter tends to form a coalition with the ﬁrst member when
she needs to adjust the interest rate because of a new shock, for instance an increase
in expected inﬂation. But as the shock vanishes, she tends to form a coalition with the
third member to return the interest rate closer to its neutral level.
Therefore, coalitions in the MPC vary with the sign of expected inﬂation and the
state variable it−1. When expected inﬂation is positive the agenda setter will look for a
11coalition with the more conservative member (member 1) if the initial interest rate is too
low. However, if the initial interest rate is too high, she forms a coalition with the less
conservative member (member 3). A similar analysis applies when expected inﬂation is
negative. Also, when the size of the shocks is too high, both other members of the MPC
agree with the agenda setter to change the interest rate as her wish.
Being the agenda setter the member with median preferences would prevent interest
rate smoothing from a political economy point of view. However, this is not always
the case, since often the most conservative member is appointed as the agenda setter.
As Barro and Gordon (1993) have pointed out, assigning the monetary policy decision
task to a conservative policy-maker can help to reduce the time inconsistency problem.
However, if the decisions are taken in an MPC, it will also induce to interest rate
smoothing. We show this in the next proposition:
Proposition 4 When the agenda setter is the more conservative member, member 1,there
is interest rate smoothing and the policy function is given by:
it = it−1 when it−1 ∈ [i2∗
t ,i1∗




t when it−1 ∈ [2i2∗
t − i1∗
t ,i2∗






According to this proposition, the policy function can take three diﬀerent functional
forms. We present the thresholds deﬁning the areas for those functions in terms of the
optimal rates for MPC members. These optimal rates are function of expected inﬂation,
which at the end also depend on the shocks and the policy decision. Therefore, the
functional form of the policy function depends on last period interest rate and the
shocks.12. In the ﬁrst functional form the interest rate doesn’t change, in the second one
the participation constraint for member 2 is binding and in the third one the interest
rate responds the same than member-1’s optimal.
In the third area, there will be always a member that will prefer the agenda setter’s
optimal rate (i1∗
t ) than the status quo rate (it−1). The agenda setter can obtain from the
voting process the same interest rate that maximises her unconstrained utility, because
the participation constraint is not binding for at least one other member. This is possible
because she has the ﬁrst moving advantage in the voting process and the change in
expected inﬂation is such that makes the last period rate sub-optimal for the other
members in comparison with i1∗
t .
In the second area, the agenda setter sets an interest rate such the participation
constraint is binding for one of the members. She chooses to make binding the partici-
pation constraint for member 2 because she has the closest preferences to hers. In such
area, the agenda setter cannot obtain from the voting process her preferred rate, but
she can obtain a rate that maximises her utility subject to the participation constraint
of member 2.
12In each row the thresholds on the left correspond to the case when expected inﬂation is positive
(Etπt+1 > 0), because in that case i2∗
t < i1∗
t . Similarly, the thresholds on the right are for the case
when expected inﬂation is negative.
12The ﬁrst area deﬁnes an area of inaction, where the participation rate of any member
does not satisfy the participation constraint of the agenda setter. That means, any rate
that satisfy the participation constraint of any other member would make the agenda
setter worst oﬀ than last period’s rate. Then, the agenda setter by any means would
prevent to have the interest rate changed. This area is deﬁned when last period’s rate
is between the optimal rate for members 1 and 2. In this area, the gains from changing
the rate are small in comparison to the cost of having an agreement, so MPC members
would prefer to leave it unchanged13.
The interest rate reaction function has a piecewise form with 2 thresholds and 3
zones, and the form depends on the sign of future expected inﬂation. When expected







t ). The reaction function is summarised in
ﬁgure 5.3. The graph on the left shows, given positive expected inﬂation, in the bold
line the interest rate reaction function and in the light line the unconstrained optimal
interest rate at i1∗
t . Similarly, the graphs on the right shows, also given positive expected
inﬂation, in the bold the change in the interest rate in period t, and in the light one the
optimal change in the unconstrained case, that is ∆it = i1∗
t − it−1.




because the interest rate change less than the optimum. In this area we have two degrees
of interest rate smoothing: when it−1 ∈ [i2∗
t ,i1∗




t ] the interest rate changes less than the optimal. In the former
case, negotiating in the MPC imposes a menu cost that makes not optimal to do small
changes to the interest rate. In the latter, the agenda setter present to vote a change
smaller than the optimal, to obtain a coalition with one of the other members, member
2.
In these graphs it is possible to see that the political economy solution can explain
both features of interest rate smoothing: the modest response of the interest rate to
inﬂation expectations and the lagged dependence. The reaction function has a smoothing
area where the interest rate either has partial adjustment or it is completely ﬁxed.
Moreover, the type of smoothing depends on the diﬀerence between the optimal rate and
the lagged interest rate. When the diﬀerence between i1∗
t and it−1 is small, the interest
rate is ﬁxed. However, when this diﬀerence takes intermediate values the interest rate
change but less than the optimal. When this diﬀerence is big enough, the change will be
equal to the optimal. Moreover, in the absence of cost-push shocks that give a trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and output volatility, the interest rate reaction function converges to
i1∗
t , the optimal reaction function for the agenda setter. This is equal to the benchmark
case with a single policymaker.
We can obtain a similar result in the opposite case, when the less conservative member
13In this area, the optimal strategy for the agenda setter is to set to vote an interest rate that
violates both participation constraints of the other two members, then from the voting process the it−1
is maintained. However, this strategic voting seems unrealistic, because the agenda setter could lose
credibility requesting those policies rates. We could also think about a more complex game, where if
none of the other members agree with the agenda setter to maintain the rate unchanged, they will have
to start again a new meeting which involves a cost. Even a small cost to keep arguing, diﬀerent from
zero, can make MPC members to maintain the rate unchanged.
13Figure 3: Interest rate reaction function: a) it, b) ∆it
is appointed as the agenda setter we have:
Proposition 5 When the agenda setter is the less conservative member, member 3,
there is interest rate smoothing and the policy function is given by:
it = it−1 when it−1 ∈ [i3∗
t ,i2∗




t when it−1 ∈ [i2∗
t ,2i2∗
t − i3∗






The proof follows the same steps as proposition 5.4. This policy function has features
similar to the previous case. There is an area where the interest rate is completely ﬁxed
and another where there is partial adjustment. Also, the coalitions are made with
member 2, who has preferences closer to the agenda setter. However, the direction of
the smoothing is diﬀerent. For example, for positive expected inﬂation, in the smoothing
area the interest rate change more than the optimal for member 3.
In this model we have interest rate smoothing when the agenda setter is either the
ﬁrst or the third member, and the reaction function is non-linear on the lagged interest
rate and expected inﬂation. An important issue in this model is to determine if this
non-linear policy rule can guarantee the existence of a rational expectations equilib-
rium. The following proposition shows that the determination properties of the rational
expectations equilibrium are satisﬁed.
Proposition 6 A suﬃcient condition for the determinacy of a rational expectations
equilibrium with the reaction functions described in propositions (5.4) and (5.5) is that
φ1 < 1 + 2
1+β
λϕ .
The proof is in the appendix D. The intuition behind this is that, as the response in
the reaction function to expected inﬂation is bounded between the optimal response for
14members 1 and 3. And also, since each of those optimal responses satisfy the conditions
for the existence of an equilibrium, this also guarantees the existence of the equilibrium
in the context of voting on a MPC. From the political economy equilibrium it can be
some sluggishness on the response of the interest rate, but this response always will be
high enough in order to control inﬂation.
4 Economic Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the rational expectations equilibrium of inﬂation and output
gap, given the interest rate reaction function of proposition (5.4). However, since the
reaction function is non-linear and the solution doesn’t have a closed solution, we need
to approximate it by a non-linear method.
4.1 Methodology
We obtain a numerical solution to the rational expectations problem using a colloca-
tion method, which allows us to obtain an approximate solution of the problem with
a high degree of accuracy. The collocation method consists on ﬁnding a function that
approximates the value of the policy functions of the problem at a ﬁnite number of
speciﬁed points14. This sub-section describes the procedure we have used. The system
of endogenous equations is the following:
xt = −ϕ[it − Etπt+1] + Etxt+1
πt = λxt + βEtπt+1 + ut
it = f (Etπt+1,it−1)
for the IS, the AS and the non-linear reaction function. The system can be written as:
F (Xt,Et (Xt+1),St) = 0 (5)
where Xt = [xt,πt,it] are the endogenous variables and St = [ut,it−1] are the state
variables, that evolves according to:
St+1 = g (Xt,et) = [ρut−1 + et,it−1] (6)
We approximate the expected value of the rational expectations solution of the model
as a non-linear function on the states:
EXt+1 = Z (St) (7)
which is unknown. The rational expectations equilibrium satisﬁes:
F (Xt,Z (St),St) = 0 (8)
St+1 = g (Xt,et)
14See Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002) for discussion on collocation methods.
15The collocation method consists on ﬁnding a function of the states, Φ(St)1xn, evaluated
in at Snx1 nodes15 to approximate Z (St) by:
Z (S) = Φ(S)C (9)
where C is a nx1 matrix of coeﬃcients. We need to solve for the matrix of coeﬃcients C
in (9) such that satisfy (8). We use linear splines evaluated at 200x200 points as a basis
for the projection method. To calculate the expected value we use numerical integration
based on Gauss-Legendre quadrature evaluated at 5 points. We select splines as the basis
function in order to have enough ﬂexibility in the approximation function to capture the
non-linearities of the solution. Similarly, we choose to approximate the expected value
of the endogenous variable because it is smoother than the solution for the endogenous
variable.
The algorithm has two steps:
Step 1: Since the interest rate reaction function is non-diﬀerentiable in the thresholds
which makes diﬃcult to apply the numerical methods to solve for (9), we use a
ﬁrst guess the following non-linear function for the interest rate:

























t are member’s 1 and 2 optimal rates, and τ is chosen such that it
minimises the approximation error. We select this non-linear form, because it captures
many of the properties of the original reaction function: the values of the reaction
function at the thresholds and at extreme values are the same. It also preserves the
shape of the original reaction function, but it is smoother at the kinks. We compare the
original with the smoothed reaction function in the following graph:
As we can see, this smoothed reaction function captures the two characteristics of
the original one: lagged dependence and modest response. Features that we want to
evaluate in a general equilibrium framework.
Step 2: We use the solution for Z (S) from step 1 as a ﬁrst guess for the real piecewise
reaction function and estimate it again the policy function using the collocation
method.
The algorithm converges after a total of 140 iterations with a degree of tolerance
of 10E − 8. We consider the following parameterisation: the discount factor β = 0.98,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ϕ = 1/5, the slope of the Philips Curve
λ = 0.2, the preference parameters for member 1 and 2 are α1 = 0.5 and α1 = 1, the
autocorrelation of the ”cost-push” shock is ρ = 0.75 and its shock is normally iid with
mean 0 and standard deviation of 0.01.
15The system is evaluated at n = n1 ∗ n2 nodes, n1 and n2 for the state space of ut and it−1,
respectively.
16Figure 4: Interest rate reaction function (original vs. smoothed function)
4.2 Policy functions
In this subsection we describe the solution of the endogenous variables as a function of
the state variables, ut and it−1, We focus on the eﬀects that the interactions within the
MPC have on the interest rate and expected inﬂation. As we see in the next graphs,
the political equilibrium problem generates lagged dependence, lower response to shocks
and an increase in expected inﬂation.
Figure 5.5 shows the policy function for the interest rate. We show in the panel on
the left the interest rate as a function of the lagged interest rate for diﬀerent values of
the cost-push shocks. It shows that the interest rate has areas where it is independent
of its lagged values, but there are areas where the response depends on its lagged value,
when such lagged value is close to the optimal. Also, these areas increase the higher
the size of the shocks. Similarly, we show in the panel on the right the interest rate as
a function of the cost-push shocks for diﬀerent values of the lagged interest rate. We
observe that there is no interest rate smoothing when the initial interest rate is close to
its neutral value (that is it−1 = 0). However, there is a lower response when the interest
rate is closer to its optimal value.
In the model the MPC takes as given expected inﬂation because there is a lack of com-
mitment. However, the interactions within the MPC generate interest rate smoothing
17Figure 5: Interest rate policy function.
and the economic agents internalise this, which also has an eﬀect in expected inﬂation.
In the next graph we compare the expected inﬂation policy function of our the model
with that of the single unconstrained policymaker. We show that the inertial behaviour
of the interest rate increases expected inﬂation proportional to the size of the cost-push
shock, but independently on the lagged interest rate. Under our benchmark param-
eterisation, a cost push shock has an additional eﬀect on expected inﬂation
of 4.5 percent. This eﬀect is independent of the lagged interest rate, because the
solution takes into account the distribution of the shocks, which smoothes the eﬀects
of the shocks. As economic agents internalise that the decisions of the MPC have an
inertial component, they consider this eﬀect in their expectations. Therefore, the more
heterogeneous the preferences in an MPC are, the eﬀect cost-push shocks on expected
inﬂation.
18Figure 6: Change in expected inﬂation (benchmark model vs. MPC model)
4.3 Impulse response to ”cost-push” shocks.
Figure 5.7 shows the eﬀect of a shock of 1 standard deviation in the cost-push shock,
for diﬀerent values of the initial interest rate and for the case of the unconstrained
policymaker. The initial interest rate takes values that can be high (3%), medium
(2.5%) or low (2%). We see that the expected response of the interest rate is diﬀerent
depending on the starting point. If the interest rate is close to the optimal, it almost
doesn’t change. However, for the case when the initial interest rate is low, the change is
higher and closer to the unconstrained case. For the intermediate value, the new rate is
in between. We can also see that this eﬀect is transitory, as in period 2 the response is
very similar for the four cases. However, since this is the expected path of the interest
rate, it is taking into account that other shocks would arrive in the next period, which
reduces the expected eﬀect of interest rate smoothing.
Similarly, ﬁgure 5.8 shows the expected responses for inﬂation and output gap. We
can observe here the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation volatility. The higher the
initial interest rate, the more interest rate smoothing and the less volatility of output in
relation with inﬂation.
19Figure 7: Impulse response to a cost-push shock: interest rate
5 Empirical Implications
The model that we develop in section 5.3 has some empirical implications. In this
section we analyse if those implications are consistent with what is observed in the
data. According to the model, more interest rate smoothing will be observed when the
preferences among MPC members are more unequal, the agenda setter has preferences
that are not in the median of the MPC members, and the size of the shocks is small.
Moreover, this result comes from the assumption that the agenda setter can inﬂuence
other members and there is an strategic game within the MPC. We analysed in this
section whether these stylised facts are consistent with the path of the oﬃcial rates for
the USA, UK, EMU, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, and with the published voting
record of the Bank of England.
Stylised fact 1: Agenda setter inﬂuence on the other members
When the MPC members vote, they express their own view about the economy.
However, we argue that in the voting process, the agenda setter can inﬂuence the votes
of some members to obtain a policy that is closer to its own optimum. Also, the other
members inﬂuence the decision of the agenda setter, because she needs the votes of
other members to have the policy approved. The ﬁnal outcome in the voting process is
a political equilibrium. There are some open questions about this: Does this strategic
behaviour take place? Has the Chairman/Governor/President of the MPC more power
and inﬂuence than her peers?
20Figure 8: Impulse response to a cost-push shock: inﬂation and output gap
Regarding the ﬁrst question, we can see from the voting record of the MPC at the
Bank of England that in almost all cases, from when the MPC started in July 1997 until
May 2006, the ﬁnal policy outcome is the same as the voting record for the Governor16 .
In other words, the agenda setter never loses. This indicates a strategic behaviour from
the agenda setter, in order to obtain the coalition needed to have a policy passed.
Also, there is evidence that the person in charge of the MPC meeting has more
power and can inﬂuence other members’ decisions; however the ﬁnal product is a political
equilibrium. We borrow some quotes made by Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006): Laurence
Meyer, Board Governor of the FOCM from 1996 to 2002, remarks on ”the chairman’s
disproportionate inﬂuence on FOMC decisions” and on ”his eﬀorts to build consensus
16The exception was the meeting of August 2005, in which the Governor – Mervyn
King invited members to vote on the proposition that the repo rate should be reduced
by 25 basis point. Five members of the committee vote in favour, whilst the other four
members, among them the Governor, preferred to maintain the rate.
21around his policy recommendations”17. Similarly, Sherman Maisel, who was a member
of the Board during Burns’ chairmanship also points out that ”while the inﬂuence of
the Chairman is indeed great, he does not make policy alone”18. Then, the interest rate
decisions come from the interaction between the agenda setter ant the other members
of the MPC.
Stylised fact 2: Heterogeneity in the preferences
The model relies on the assumption that MPC members have diﬀerent preferences.
This heterogeneity, together with strategic behaviour of the agenda setter, causes interest
rate smoothing. How heterogeneous are the preferences among members? Do they really
think diﬀerently? We take as an indicator of this heterogeneity the dissenting record
of each member with respect to the agenda setter. We construct this indicator using
the information of the voting record for the Bank of England, which is available for the
period since the MPC was established in July 1997.
Gerlach-Kristen (2003) analyses the voting record of the BoE since the introduction of
the MPC. She characterise the MPC member in four groups: the ﬁrst group, the agenda
setter, always vote with the majority; the second group, the ”doves”, when dissenting
always favoured a level of interest rates lower than that set by the majority; the third
group, the ”hawks”, always favoured a tighter monetary policy when dissenting; and
the fourth group doesn’t show a systematic preference to higher or lower rates. We
can classify the members of the third (second) group as those that are more (less)
conservative than the agenda setter.
In table 5.1 and 5.2 we classify the MPC members in the four categories as Gerlach-
Kristen (2003a) for both, the governorship of Sir Edward George and Mr. Mervyn King.
For this classiﬁcation we consider if the preferred rate when dissenting was higher or
lower than the voted rate, and how frequent they dissent. We have considered only
those members with at least ten votes in the record and those that show systematic
preferences to either lower or higher rates. Also, we have also classiﬁed the members as
internal or external depending on the way they are appointed19.
Table 5.1 shows the classiﬁcation during the Governorship of Sir Edward George
from July 1997 to June 2003, and table 5.2 for the Governorship of Mr Mervyn King
from July 2003 to June 2006. The members are classiﬁed by its conservativeness degree,
being those at the top the more conservative20
According to this classiﬁcation, we can see some diﬀerences on MPC members pref-
erences across sub-samples. First, Sir George has been on average closer to the median
preferences than Mr. King does. Second, we can see more dispersion among MPC
member’s preferences during Mr King’s governorship than during Sir Edward George’s
17Meyer (2004), p.50.
18Maisel (1973), p.124.
19The MPC at the Bank of England was established in June 1997. It has nine mem-
bers, ﬁve full-time Bank executives (the Governor and two Deputy Governors, the Chief
Economist and the Markets Director) and four external members, who are appointed
for a three-year term by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
20For instance, according our classiﬁcation Sir Budd has been the most conservative
during Sir George Governorship, since he has preferred proportionally more times a
higher rate than the Governor.
22Governorship. Third, the MPC members internally appointed show a tendency to be
more conservative than those appointed externally. According to these features, our
model predicts under Mr. King’s governorship, ceteris paribus, more interest smoothing
than under Sir King’s governorship. Eﬀectively, during Mr King’s governorship, the
oﬃcial rate has been maintained 80 percent of the time, in comparison to 68 percent in
Sir Edward George’s governorship.
23Frequency of which for
of dissents higher rate Appointment
The most conservative
Sir Alan Budd 22.2% 100.0% External
John Vickers 17.9% 100.0% Internal
Mervyn King 16.2% 100.0% Internal
Charles Goodhart 8.3% 100.0% External
Paul Tucker 7.7% 100.0% Internal
Sir Edward George (Governor) 0.0% 0.0% Internal
Charles Bean 2.9% 0.0% Internal
Kate Barker 11.5% 0.0% External
Sushil Wadhwani 35.1% 0.0% External
DeAnne Julius 28.9% 0.0% External
Christopher Allsopp 29.7% 0.0% External
Marian Bell 25.0% 0.0% External
The least conservative
Table 1: Classiﬁcation MPC members: Sir George’s governorship
Frequency of which for
of dissents higher rate Appointment
The most conservative
Sir Andrew Large 25.8% 100.0% Internal
Paul Tucker 11.4% 100.0% Internal
Rachel Lomax 2.9% 100.0% Internal
Mervyn King (Governor) 0.0% 0.0% Internal
Kate Barker 2.9% 0.0% External
Richard Lambert 3.0% 0.0% External
Charles Bean 8.6% 0.0% Internal
David Walton 9.1% 0.0% External
Marian Bell 12.5% 0.0% External
Stephen Nickell 25.7% 11.1% External
The least conservative
Table 2: Classiﬁcation MPC members: Mr. King’s governorship
24Stylised fact 3: Dispersion of preferences and interest rate smoothing
The model predicts that the more heterogeneous the preferences are, if the agenda
setter is not the median member, ceteris paribus will be more interest rate smoothing.
To analyse this fact, we compare the paths of the oﬃcial interest rate for the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). We expect those economies
to have similar paths for interest rate decisions, since the main trading partners for
Switzerland are the members of the EMU and those economies are hit by similar shocks.
However, the pattern of the oﬃcial interest rate for the SNB is more dynamic than for the
ECB. On average, the changes of the interest rate had a duration of ﬁve months for the
SNB in comparison to seven months in the ECB. Also, the SNB has changed the interest
rate by higher amounts than the ECB, the mode in the change of the interest rate is 0.5
percent for the SNB in contrast to 0.25 percent for the ECB. This would be explained by
how the MPCs are formed in both central banks. At the ECB, the Governing Council is
formed by the six members of the Executive Board, plus the governors of all the national
central banks (NCBs) from the 12 euro area countries, while at the SNB, the Governing
Board in charge of monetary policy decisions is formed of only three members.
In table 5.3 we show some rough indicators about the dynamics of the oﬃcial interest
rate for six countries. The ﬁrst indicator is the average duration of a change in the
interest rate; we expect that the easier it is to have an agreement within the MPC, the
lower the interest rate smoothing and the more frequent the adjustment in the rate. The
second indicator is the mode of the change in the interest rate, the easier it is to have












Canada Abr-96 0.25 2.4 6 8
United Kingdom Jun-97 0.25 3.3 9 12
USA Ene-96 0.25 3.3 12 8
Switzerland Ene-00 0.50 5.4 3 12
EMU Ene-01 0.25 7.0 18 11
Sweden Jun-94 0.25 2.2 6 8-9
Table 3: Dynamics of Oﬃcial Interest Rate
According to the ﬁrst indicator, Canada and Sweden have the more active central
banks, where a change in the interest rate lasts on average two months, followed by
the United Kingdom and the USA with three months. While according to the second
indicator, Switzerland is more active with a mode in the changes of the interest rate of
0.5 percent, a diﬀerence from the other countries whose interest rates usually change
by 0.25 percent. Both indicators also suggest that the central bank with more interest
rate smoothing is the ECB, which changes the interest rate every seven months on
average, at steps of 0.25 percent. As we mentioned before, these results are related to
the composition of the MPC. The MPC in Switzerland has only 3 members, and Canada
and Sweden 6; in contrast to the MPC in the USA and the EMU, which they have 12
and 18, respectively. The more members an MPC has, the more likely that their the
preferences will diﬀer and the more diﬃcult it is to have an agreement.
256 Conclusions
This paper helps to explain the existing puzzle in the optimal monetary policy literature
of interest rate smoothing: why in practice do central banks change the interest rate
less frequently than the theory predicts? In doing this, we extend the New Keynesian
Monetary Policy literature relaxing the assumption that the decisions are taken by a
single policy maker, considering instead that monetary policy decisions are taken col-
lectively in a committee. We introduce a Monetary Policy Committee whose members
have diﬀerent preferences between output and inﬂation stabilisation and have to vote on
the level of the interest rate. Also, there is one member in charge of setting the agenda
of the meeting, which can be the Chairman/Governor/President of the MPC.
We explain interest rate smoothing from a political economy point of view, in which
MPC members face a bargaining problem on the level of the interest rate. In this
framework, the interest rate is a non-linear reaction function on the lagged interest rate
and the expected inﬂation. This result comes from a political equilibrium in which there
is a strategic behaviour of the agenda setter with respect to the other MPC members in
order to maximise his own policy objective.
According to the model, there is not such interest rate smoothing when the agenda
setter is the member with median preferences. As in the median voter theorem, she
can always get a coalition to have her most preferred (lagged independent) interest rate.
However, when the agenda setter is either one of the most or the least conservative
members, it will be interest rate smoothing from a political economy point of view.
Also, interest rate smoothing is higher when the preferences among the MPC members
are more heterogeneous.
The size of the shocks is also important for interest rate smoothing. We ﬁnd that
the interest rate will adjust in the same magnitude as in the single policymaker case
when the size of the shocks is high enough. However, when the size of the shocks is
of intermediate size, we have found that the interest rate adjusts partially in order to
form a coalition between the agenda setter and at least one of the other two members.
Also, when the size of the shocks is small, it is preferred to maintain the interest rate
unchanged.
We present this explanation of interest rate smoothing as an alternative approach
in order to reproduce altogether both features documented by the empirical evidence of
interest rate smoothing: the modest response of the interest rate to inﬂation and the
lagged dependence. These are features that other models fail to reproduce at the same
time. Our model also provides a theoretical framework on how disagreement among
policy makers can slow the adjustment on interest rates and on ‘menu costs’ in interest
rate decisions.
We also present some evidence based on the oﬃcial interest rate path for ﬁve central
banks and the voting record at the Bank of England. We show that this information
is consistent with the assumptions of the model and with the results. We observe in
the data that central banks whose members have more heterogeneous preferences adjust
the interest rate less frequently, as in the case of the European Central Bank and the
FED. Central banks with fewer members adjust the interest rate more aggressively, as
in the case of the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Sweden.
26Also, according to the voting records at the Bank of England, there is also evidence
of heterogeneity in the voting preferences among the members of the MPC, which is
positive related to the degree of interest rate smoothing.
We do some quantitative exercises to show how interest rate smoothing in our model
aﬀect the economic equilibrium. We show that interest rate smoothing increases the
eﬀects of cost-push shocks on expected inﬂation by 4.5 percent given our benchmark
calibration. As economic agents internalise the inertial component of the MPC decisions,
they also consider this eﬀect when forming expectations.
.
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307 Appendix: Proof of propositions
7.1 Proof of proposition 5.1:
We divide the proof in two steps: ﬁrst the policy-maker chooses xt and πt to maximise
her welfare subject to the aggregate supply. Then, conditional on the optimal values of
xt and πt, she determines the value of it implied by the IS.
















πt = λxt + βEtπt+1 + ut
Since the policymaker cannot credibly manipulate beliefs in the absence of commitment,
she takes private sector expectations as given when solving her optimisation problem.
Then, conditional on the policymaker’s optimal rule, the private sector forms beliefs
rationally. Therefore, the policymaker takes EtWt+1 and βEtπt+1as given in her optimi-
sation problem.





According to this condition, whenever inﬂation is above target, the policymaker contracts
demand below capacity by raising the interest rate; and vice versa when it is below target.
The aggressiveness of the policymaker depends positively on the gain in reduced inﬂation
per unit of output loss, λ, and inversely on the relative weight placed on output losses
α.
In order to obtain the reduced for expression for xt and πt, we combine the ﬁrst order
condition with the PC, and then impose that private sector expectations are rational to
obtain:





where $ = λ
λ2+α(1−βρ) is a decreasing function of the preference parameter α. From the
second step, the optimal feedback policy for the interest rate is found by inserting the




where φπ = 1 +
(1−ρ)λ
ρϕα > 1.
317.2 Proof of proposition 5.2:
Replace the IS and the AS in the welfare function of member j and operate:
W
j




αj [−ϕ(it − Etπt+1 − rn
t ) + Etxt+1]
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(4)
factorise ϕ(it − it−1) and rearrange the terms that are similar:
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t (it) − W
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replace (7) in (5) and factorise the term (αj + λ2), we obtain:
W
j
t (it) − W
j

















αj+λ2 (βEtπt+1 + ut)
)
(8)
make use of the AS and (6) to eliminate some terms. The condition can be written by:
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j
t (it) − W
j















We have that W
j
t (it) = W
j
t (it−1) when either it = it−1 or it = 2i
j∗
t − it−1 = i
j
t
7.3 Proof of proposition 5.4
Let’s analyse the case when Etπt+1 > 0, the proof for the opposite case is similar. When









32We will analyse three possible cases: when the agenda setter can set the interest rate
equal to her most preferred rate (i1∗
t ), to the participation rate of either member 2 (i2
t)
or 3 (i3
t), or the status-quo (it−1). Case 1: when member 2 or member 3 accept agenda
setter’s preferred rate (i1∗




































t or when it−1 > i1∗
t .






t . Then, since i3∗
t < i2∗
t , when either it−1 ≤ 2i2∗
t − i1∗
t or it−1 > i1∗
t at least one
member will accept i1∗
t . Case 2: when the agenda setter will prefer to attract the vote
of member 2 with i = i2 instead of the vote of member 3 with i = i3?









































otherwise she will prefer to attract the votes of member 3 with i = i3.
The agenda setter will always prefer to set i1∗
t . However, when it is not possible to
obtain the votes for i1∗
t , she can obtain the votes of either member 2 or 3 setting the
participation rate. But, we still need to compare if the agenda setter can be better-oﬀ
with the status quo than with the participation rate. As the agenda setter has the ﬁrst
moving advantage, she can inﬂuence the votes of the other members if she prefer to
maintain the rate unchanged. Case 3: when the agenda setter prefer the status quo to

































t (it−1) when it−1 > i2∗








t (it−1) when it−1 > i3∗
t .
Then, when i2∗
t < it−1 < i1∗
t : the agenda setter will prefer the status quo to rate
necessary to obtain the votes.
In the remaining area (2i2∗
t − i1∗
t < it−1 < i2∗






agenda setter can attract the votes of member 2 setting it = i2
t. This deﬁne four areas
of the interest rate reaction function when Etπt+1 > 0.
7.4 Proof of proposition 5.6
Consider F as the forward operator, the Phillips curve equation and the IS equation can
be expressed as:
(1 − βF)πt = λxt + ut (10)
(1 − F)xt = −ϕ(it − Fπt) (11)
33where it is function of expected inﬂation. Multiply (10) by (1 − F) and subtract (11):
(1 − F)(1 − βF)πt + λϕ(it − Fπt) = (1 − F)ut (12)
In order to have a stable rational expectations equilibrium, we need that the roots
of F in the left hand side of (12) being outside the unit circle.












F = −(1 − F)(1 − βF) (13)
being outside the unit circle. The value of φj at the boundary F = 1 is φj = 1.
Similarly, the value at the boundary F = −1 is φj = 1 + 2
1+β







satisﬁes the determinacy condition. As φ1 > φ2 > φ3 > 1, a suﬃcient
condition for determinacy is that φ1 < 1 + 2
1+β
λϕ .
To analyse the roots of F in (12) for the policy rule in proposition (5.4) or (5.5), note
that it is bounded by preferred rate for member 1 and 3,that is: it ∈ [φ3Fπt,φ1Fπt].
Then








πt ≤ q (F)πt + λϕ(it − Fπt) (14)
≤









where we have deﬁned the polynomial q (F) ≡ −(1 − F)(1 − βF). In the following
ﬁgure we graph the polynomial q (F) and the two lines λϕ(φ3 − 1)F and λϕ(φ1 − 1),
which satisfy the determinacy condition. The intersection of each line with q (F) give
the value for the root of F. On the other hand, the root for the policy function it is
located on the segment of q (F) between both lines. Also, note that any point in that
segment satisﬁes the determinacy condition, and the exact position will depend on the
last period interest rate.
34Figure 1: Determinacy condition
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